浙江电力

2024, v.43;No.336(04) 51-62

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基于动态主从博弈模型的综合能源系统碳交易方法
A carbon trading method for integrated energy systems based on a dynamic masterslave game model

陈勇,芮俊,肖雷鸣,邓超
CHEN Yong,RUI Jun,XIAO Leiming,DENG Chao

摘要(Abstract):

为完善发展碳交易机制中多主体之间的利益互动关系,提出一种以碳交易JMO(联合市场运营商)为领导者、多主体IES(综合能源系统)为跟随者的主从博弈方法,实现不同IES的低碳经济运行。首先,在碳排放阶梯惩罚机制下对各利益主体IES运行效益进行建模分析,提出IES低碳排和低成本双重模式可选的运行策略。其次,基于动态非合作Stackelberg博弈优化框架,根据各利益主体的运行模式,建立多主体参与的碳交易模型。最后,分别采用自适应差分进化算法和Gurobi求解器对主从博弈决策模型进行求解。算例分析结果表明,该碳交易机制可有效实现IES运行的低碳性和经济性。
To enhance the interaction among multiple agents in carbon trading mechanisms, a leader-follower game method is proposed, with carbon trading JMO(joint market operator) as the leader and multiple IES(integrated energy systems) as followers. This method aims to achieve low-carbon economic operation for different IES. Firstly, under the tiered penalty mechanism for carbon emission, the operational benefits of various agents' IES are modeled and analyzed. A dual-mode operation strategy for IES, which includes options for low carbon emission and low cost, is proposed. Secondly, based on the dynamic non-cooperative Stackelberg game optimization framework, a carbon trading model involving multiple agents is established according to the operational modes of each agent. Finally, the decision-making model of the leader-follower game is solved using both adaptive differential evolution(DE) algorithm and the Gurobi optimizer. Case analysis results demonstrate that this carbon trading mechanism can effectively achieve both low-carbon and economic operation for IES.

关键词(KeyWords): 低碳;综合能源系统;碳排放;碳交易;动态非合作Stackelberg博弈
low carbon;IES;carbon emission;carbon trading;dynamic non-cooperative Stackelberg game

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 浙江大有集团有限公司科技项目(DY2022-22);; 浙江省科技计划项目(2024C01018)

作者(Author): 陈勇,芮俊,肖雷鸣,邓超
CHEN Yong,RUI Jun,XIAO Leiming,DENG Chao

DOI: 10.19585/j.zjdl.202404006

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