金仁云,陈铁义,YU Yimeng
JIN Renyun,CHEN Tieyi,YU Yimeng

• 1:国网浙江省电力有限公司建设分公司
• 2:国网浙江电力有限公司科技创新中心
• 3:杭州迈拓大数据服务有限公司

摘要(Abstract)：

随着电力需求侧管理工作的不断推进，如何提升电网企业、电力用户等重要实施主体的参与积极性已成为当前亟待解决的问题。通过构建包含政府、电网企业和电力用户在内的动态演化博弈模型，分析不同博弈策略下三者之间的作用机制、成本收益及外部效应，讨论系统均衡点的稳定性情况。在此基础上通过仿真分析，验证动态演化博弈模型的科学性，结果表明：当系统中政府在兼顾自身成本与收益平衡的基础上增加激励力度、电网企业或电力用户的正外部效应增加时，各方的参与度会显著提升，达到电力需求侧管理稳态均衡的时间也会缩短。
With the continuous development of power demand side management(DSM) in China, enhancing the participation of key stakeholders, such as power grid enterprises and electricity users, has become an urgent issue to address. By constructing a dynamic evolutionary game model involving the government, power grid enterprises, and electricity users, the paper analyzes the interaction mechanisms, cost-benefit relationships, and the external effects among the three parties under different game strategies, as well as the stability of the system's equilibrium points. Based on this analysis, the scientific rigor of the dynamic evolutionary game model is validated through simulation. The results indicate that when the government increases incentive while balancing its own costs and benefits, and when the positive external effects for grid enterprises or electricity users increase, the participation levels of all parties significantly rise. Consequently, the time required to achieve a steady-state equilibrium in power demand side management is also reduced.

关键词(KeyWords)： 电力需求侧管理;动态演化博弈模型;外部效应;演化稳定策略
power demand side management;dynamic evolutionary game model;external effects;evolutionarily stable strategy

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国网浙江省电力有限公司科技项目（B311JZ230003）

作者(Author): 金仁云,陈铁义,YU Yimeng
JIN Renyun,CHEN Tieyi,YU Yimeng

DOI: 10.19585/j.zjdl.202412005

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